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The turn of the 21st century marked the beginning of a modern age in human history. As 
developing nations continued on their paths to industrialization, global markets became inter-
connected, and large swaths of the people were lifted out of poverty throughout the world. As 
market demand increased due to the influx of new capital, new alliances between nations were 
drawn and the production of goods transformed.  
In today’s day and age, firms are more globally fragmented than ever before. Rarely do 
firms house all facets of production in one location and serve only one market; instead, 
production is separated to cheapen product cost and maximize efficiency. Though this practice is 
beneficial for the firms involved, it simultaneously complicates how nation’s control markets and 
protect domestic industries. It is necessary for governments to properly determine firm 
nationality if they are to govern and regulate appropriately. 
Throughout the Trump presidency (2016-2020), US-China relations were stressed as 
President Trump’s “America First” protectionist trade policies clashed with China’s attempts to 
become more self-sufficient. As the nations battled back and forth through a trade war, firms 
were caught in the middle, awaiting determinations of their fate which was decided based upon 
their perceived nationality. Accuracy in this process was crucial to limit the damage to markets 
that sanctions and tariffs would bring; there was little room for error. While sometimes the 






The recent conflict between the United States government, ARM Ltd. (ARM), and 
telecommunications giant Huawei is one such example that demonstrates the complexities of 
defining firm nationality. In May of 2019, the US government alleged that Huawei was a 
national security risk due to the thought that the Chinese government could use the equipment it 
produced to spy on American networks. Huawei repeatedly denied the allegations, but the United 
States stood firm and enforced sanctions, all but banning American companies from doing 
business with Huawei. This situation complicated Huawei’s relationships with its suppliers, one 
of them being ARM.  
ARM. specializes in the sale of internally developed intellectual property and is the 
primary designer of the CPU and GPU of Huawei’s processors; its designs are used in 95% of 
the world’s smartphones.1 Without ARM, Huawei “would effectively be unable to produce new 
processors” and thus, would be unable to produce new phones.2   While ARM is based in the 
United Kingdom (UK), it is owned by the SoftBank Group in Japan and has offices throughout 
the United States; it is truly a global firm.  
Given that ARM believed some of its technology had originated in the United States, its 
leadership made the decision that the company fell within the extraterritoriality of US law and 
thus, that their firm was subject to adhering to the ban on selling technology to Huawei, In May 
of 2019, ARM officially cut ties with Huawei and opened an internal investigation into the 
matter. While the investigation was underway, Huawei’s existence as a firm came into question. 
Without ARM’s designs, Huawei’s production of processors came to a halt, and the firm was 
 
1 ARM Ltd., Accelerating Digital Immersion on Smartphones. 






pushed to the brink of disaster. Nearly five months later, ARM’s leadership reversed its decision 
and continued its sale of IP to Huawei when it determined that the technology in its designs was, 
in fact, from the UK. 
 As can be seen from this dilemma, firm nationality can have real, potentially crippling 
implications for firms and broader market structures. Defining firm nationality is not just an 
academic exercise; rather, it has relevant policy implications. No matter the stances that the 
United States and China take going forward, it will be of vital importance that decisions are 















Since the 1990s, vertically integrated firms have fragmented, and production “tasks” have 
been increasingly outsourced and internationalized. Most products are produced through 
complex networks of firms located around the world, but functionally integrated by “lead” firms 
that coordinate the value chains.3 This has created unprecedented levels of “interdependence” 
between countries, as national economies have become interwoven, blurring the boundaries of 
the national origin of firms and products. It is no longer possible to say that one product is 
“Made in Japan” or another is “Made in China.” To varying degrees, all products are “Made in 
the World.” 
 The fragmentation of production is particularly pronounced in high-tech industries 
because of the high levels of modularization that can be done. Modularity means that the 
interface between two components of a product is highly standardized, facilitating easy 
interoperability; lead firms concentrate on “creation, penetration, and defense of markets for end 
products,” while manufacturing takes place globally through various “turn-key suppliers.”4 This 
allows very complicated products to interoperate easily and transfer complex information 
through a simplified and standardized interface. A simple example of this is USB drives on one’s 
 
3 Dicken, Global Shift, 2015, p. 50; Baldwin, The Great Convergence, 2016, p. 4.  






computer, but similar examples occur in all areas of high-tech. Such modularization has not only 
facilitated increasing specialization and fragmentation, but it has also influenced the advent of 
contemporary “global value chains.” The fragmentation of the once domestic firm has clashed 
with increasingly nationalistic foreign economic and industrial policies and has led some 
countries to question the implications of a global economy; this has been especially true 
regarding China and the United States.  
China has become one of the centers of modular production since the 1990s, which has 
arguably been the primary driving force of its very rapid economic and now technological 
development.5 China is no longer a “nation in despair,” but rather, through a combination of 
economic fundamentals, foreign investment, technology transfers, and government industrial 
policies, it has steadily “moved up the value chain” to higher value-added tasks.6  
Over the last two decades, China’s rise to its current state as “the factory of the world” 
has coincided with an internally driven movement towards becoming technologically self-
sufficient.7 With many of its existing industries being “low value add, energy-intensive, and 
highly polluting,” the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), under the rule of President Xi Jinping, 
has initiated China Manufacturing 2025 (CM2025), a comprehensive, nationalistic plan to 
“upgrade its industrial base and to compete in more advanced market segments [worldwide].”8 
Already possessing 20% of the total share of global manufacturing, CM2025 is the “first of a 
three-stage plan for establishing China as a leading global manufacturing power by 2049, the 
 
5 Steinfeld, Taking Industry Global, 2010, p. 71.  
6 Steinfeld, Taking Industry Global, 2010, p. 70.  
7 European Chamber, China Manufacturing 2025 Putting Industrial Policy Ahead of Market Forces, 2017, p. 2,  






100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China.”9 Defining self-sufficiency 
as domestically sourcing “40 and 70 percent of both core components and key basic materials by 
2020 and 2025 respectively,” CM2025 will require a drastic overhaul of existing infrastructure if 
it is to be successful.10 
Fearing that CM2025, and other such policies, “may negatively affect American 
economic interests… inhibit United States exports, deprive United States citizens of fair 
remuneration for their innovations, divert American jobs to workers in China, contribute to our 
trade deficit with China, and otherwise undermine American manufacturing, services, and 
innovation,” the Trump administration launched an investigation into China’s practices under 
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.11 As a result of the inquiry, not only was CM2025 deemed 
to specifically target “ten strategic industries,” but the Chinese government was found to be 
funding the acquisition of American technologies through privately owned firms.12 Considering 
these actions to be government attempts to undermine US control of markets, the United States 
began to form policies targeting Chinese firms. This has not only led to the politicization of 
companies such as Huawei, a Chinese multinational technology firm, but has led many to 
question how exactly the nationality of a firm is defined.  
 
9 Ibid, 3, 8. 
10 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Findings of The Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and 
Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act 
of 1974, (2018), p.1-15. 
11 US Gov., Memorandum Addressing China’s Laws, Policies, Practices, and Actions Related to Intellectual 
Property, Innovation, and Technology, (2017), p.1-3 
12  Office of the United States Trade Representative, Findings of The Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and 
Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act 








The defining of firms by nationality assumes that in a highly globalized world, a firm’s 
nationality can be easily determined, but it is not that simple. Given the increasing complexity of 
global value chains, the intertwining of firms, and the international flow of finances, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to define the firm nationality. For instance, in the media, TikTok 
is branded as a ‘Chinese’ firm. While the headquarters is in Beijing under a company named 
Bytedance, its legal jurisdiction is the Cayman Islands, over 40% of it is owned by American 
venture capitalists, most of its executives are foreigners, including its most recent two CEOs (one 
left Disney to become CEO), and 100% of its sales come from outside China. Is this a Chinese 
firm?  
 This is no longer just a theoretical question. With the rise of economic nationalism in the 
US and China and technology tensions in full swing, both countries constantly target firms 
perceived to be threats. Thus, government policies require a clear set of criteria by which to 
define the nationality of a firm. If regulation of firms goes too far, it can be dangerous to markets 
as a whole, while on the other hand, if regulation is insufficient, existing value chains may be 
absorbed by other countries.  
The nuance of this issue has inspired my thesis, which aims to examine a broad cross-
section of high-tech firms that are nominally headquartered in China. My goal is to explore the 
degree to which high-tech firms can be considered “Chinese” across a range of categories, like 
ownership, geographic location, the nation of its executives’ educations, etc. Combining data 
across chosen categories, I aim to identify factors that influence the degree to which firms should 






Manufacturing 2025, engaged in more leading-edge technologies (like AI), and targeted by 














This chapter aims to contextualize China’s historical progression from a developing 
nation to a world superpower. Through a discussion of China’s 20th century economic reforms, I 
aim to identify the most notable events contributing to China’s growth and track the origins of 
the conflict between China and the United States.  
 
2.1 CHINA’S REFORMS AND THE RISE OF A 
SUPERPOWER 
China’s push for modernization came long before any attempt at self-sufficiency in 
technologies. Largely isolated for much of its history, China long sought to keep true to its 
traditions and separate itself from Western influence. Although China had abundant natural 
resources and a robust economy primarily revolving around agriculture throughout the 18th 
century, “internal crises and invasions by Western powers, Japan and Russia,” in the 19th century 
lead to the opening up of its borders and its push for industrialization. 13 Recognizing the 
shortcomings of keeping itself isolated, China slowly began to accept that the most efficient path 
to development would be by “learning from the West.”14  
 







Aiming to enhance its military and economic development while remaining true to 
Chinese culture, in the early 20th century, China began a strategy dubbed “self-strengthening” 
and through it, sent students to industrialized nations, “introduced Western science into Chinese 
educational institutions,” and imported Western technologies in hopes of advancing.15 Although 
the Chinese had hoped to limit broad foreign influence, over time, interactions with the West 
began to lead to outside investment and the opening up of Chinese markets to the rest of the 
world. 
After a number of internal conflicts throughout the first half of the 20th century, in 1949, 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), led by Mao Zedong, took over control of China and 
renamed it the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Hoping to follow in the footsteps of the Soviet 
Union, which industrialized rapidly, the CCP closed China to the world and began a series of 
five-year plans intended to “facilitate industrial growth.”16 After the First Five-Year Plan (1953-
1957), which helped to urbanize Chinese cities, Mao instituted the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-
1962), commonly referred to as the Great Leap Forward, in hopes of stimulating agricultural 
surpluses to provide for the growing populations in cities.  
To procure the amount of food needed, the Chinese government seized private property 
and forced rural farmers to work together in communes for the common good. Although initially 
successful, this plan took a turn for the worse when famine struck from 1959-1961, and an 
estimated 30 million Chinese citizens perished.17 The Great Leap Forward’s failure served as an 
 
15 Ibid. 
16 Yeh, Economic Transition and Urban Transformation of China: Interplay of the State and the Market, 2015, p. 2. 






underpinning for the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and the eventual implementation of the 
“Open Door Policy” in 1978.  
Seeking to eradicate the “capitalist roaders in authority within the [CCP],” in 1966, Mao 
launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and, in doing so, a war against the Chinese 
people themselves.18 Shutting down schools nationally, Mao called for the youths of China to rid 
the nation of the “‘Four Olds: old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas.’” 19 
Forming “paramilitary groups called the Red Guards,” young people joined together to fight 
back against “class enemies,” many of which were politicians, neighbors, and even family 
members; in total, an estimated 500,000 to 2,000,000 people were killed throughout China 
during this period, and another 20 million were banished. As a result, the Chinese economy was 
crippled, and “the living standards of the majority of the population” were reduced.20 The 
Cultural Revolution came to an end in 1976 with Mao’s death, but its effects would be felt for 
years to come.  
After Mao’s death, led by Deng Xiaoping, China undertook several massive reforms, 
most notably adopting the “Open Door Policy” in 1978. Attempting to repair the damage done in 
the decades prior and “under strong popular pressure to raise living standards and expand 
individual freedoms,” Deng elected to open China up to the rest of the world and to transform the 
economy from centrally-based to market-based.21 Under Deng, Hong Kong was returned to 
China from the British, relations were established with the United States, and inflows of foreign 
 
18 Chan, The Image of a "Capitalist Roader"-Some Dissident Short Stories in the Hundred Flowers Period, 1979, p. 78-85. 
19 History.com Editors, Cultural Revolution, History.com 2020. 







direct investment were allowed to access China for the first time.22 His leadership also propelled 
China’s economic growth, increasing the GDP from $185 Per Capita in 1977 to $311 Per Capita 
at the end of his rule in 1987; over the same years, China grew from the “world’s thirty-second 
ranked exporting country… to the world’s thirteenth largest trading nation.” 23  
After the end of Deng Xiaoping’s rule, China continued its push towards modernization 
through its adoption of a Socialist Market Economy in 1992. This economic system is explicitly 
defined in Article 6 of China’s Constitution: 
 
"The basis of the socialist economic system of the People's Republic of China is socialist 
public ownership of the means of production, namely, ownership by the whole people 
and collective ownership by the working people... In the primary stage of socialism, the 
state upholds the basic economic system with public ownership remaining dominant and 
diverse forms of ownership developing side by side.”24 
 
Ensuring “the equity of society” through socialism while assuring economic efficiency through 
the market, this combination aims to capture the best of both systems while limiting their 
faults.25 Coinciding with the creation Socialist Market Economy, China began to encourage 
domestic investment and ownership by the people through the opening of the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in the early 1990s. A few short years later, the first Chinese firm, 
Shandong Huaneng Power Development Co Ltd, would be listed on the New York Stock 
 
22 Issitt, Deng Xiaoping, 2006, p.2. 
23 MacroTrends, “China GDP Per Capita 1960-2021,” MacroTrends; Lardy, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in 
China, 1992, p. 2 
24 Ding, “The Socialist Market Economy: China and the World,” 2009, p. 236. 






Exchange. With capital flowing between individuals and firms throughout China, the nation had 
found the fuel that would power its growth over the following decades.  
Simultaneous with China’s economic growth was a newfound commitment to combatting 
poverty. Large scale poverty reduction in the post-1978 reform period had helped to halve 
China’s poverty rate from “49 to 24 percent at the $1/day income level in the 1980s” and reduce 
the number of rural poor from 250 million in 1978 to 125 million in 1985, measured at the 
official poverty line.”26 Although this progress slowed in the early 1990s and the poverty rate 
had stalled at about 18 percent, at the $1/day level, the government quickly responded through its 
8-7 National Poverty Reduction Program (1994).27 This program aimed to “lift the majority of 
the remaining 80 million poor above the government’s poverty line, during the seven-years 
between 1994-2000, and was largely successful.28 
China’s emerging economy was not without state control; a broad state-strategy of 
Grasping the Large and Letting go of the Small, as discussed by Chang-Tai Hsieh and Zheng 
(Michael) Song, led to the government privatizing or closing small state-owned firms and 
merging larger, state-owned firms into large industrial groups under the control of the Chinese 
state.”29 This practice created many new and large firms that accounted for 23.2 percent of the 
industrial sector’s aggregate growth from 1998-2007; although this control has somewhat faded, 
the state’s footprint remains very large to this day. 30   
 
26 Sangui, Zhou, and Yanshun, The 8-7 National Poverty Reduction Program in Chinaó The National Strategy and 
Its Impact, 2004, p. 3. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Hsieh and Zheng, Grasp the Large, Let Go of the Small: The Transformation of the State Sector in China, 2015, p. 
1. 






By the turn of the century, China had become a formidable force in the manufacturing 
market and, on December 2, 2001, was able to join the World Trade Organization (WTO).31 
Able to influence the price-setting of “manufactured goods in the world market,” and thus having 
the ability to “trigger a global deflation,” China had slowly become a world power.32 To continue 
this growth, China launched the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor program (QFII), which 
allowed approved foreign capital to be invested in China’s domestic securities market.33  
With ample capital flowing into the country, China began its Medium-to Long-Term Plan 
for the Development of Science and Technology (2006), which called for it to become an 
“innovation-oriented society” by the year 2020, and a world leader in science 
and technology (S&T) by 2050.34 To jumpstart this goal, China committed to raising gross 
research and development (R&D) expenditures to 2.5% of its Gross Domestic Product, limiting 
its dependence on foreign technology to no more than 30%, and becoming a world leader in the 
number of patents granted, by the year 2020.35  
All in all, China’s internal decisions in the post-reform period led to it “growing at a 
nearly 10% average annual rate for three decades” and becoming the second-largest economy in 
the world since 2010.36 Coming to power as the president of the PRC in 2013, Xi Jinping 
immediately enacted policies to continue this tremendous progress. Establishing the One Belt 
One Road initiative (2013), commonly referred to as the “Belt and Road initiative,” Jinping took 
 
31Yang, China's Integration into the World Economy: Implications for Developing Countries, 2013, p. 4. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Shenzhen Stock Exchange, About QFII. 
34 Cong, China’s 15-Year Science and Technology Plan, Physics Today, 2006. 
35 Ibid. 







a significant step to expedite China’s push to become a global superpower. Aiming to “stimulate 
economic development by dramatically enhancing regional interconnectivity,” the Belt and Road 
initiative aims to connect the landmasses of the world through “a dense network of both ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ infrastructure,” all linked to China.37 Although this project is a massive undertaking, in 
terms of both capital and time, if successful, it will be “one of the defining economic and 
political constructs of the first half of the 21st century” and solidify China’s role on the world 
stage.38 
China Manufacturing 2025, in combination with the Belt and Road initiative, is China’s 
plan to exploit the global nature of today’s markets. Targeting advanced information technology 
(IT); robotics and automated machine tools; aircraft and aircraft components; maritime vessels 
and marine engineering equipment; advanced rail equipment; new energy vehicles; electrical 
generation and transmission equipment; agricultural machinery and equipment; new materials; 
and pharmaceuticals and advanced medical devices, China is hoping to take control of its destiny 
and no longer be reliant on external nations.39 Though these goals are undoubtedly lofty, if China 
can become self-sufficient in the identified industries and put in place the global infrastructure to 
facilitate quick, easy trade, its growth potential is nearly limitless.  
As discussed earlier, China has been met with a great deal of pushback from the United 
States regarding its plans. As has been seen throughout history, there can only be one true world 
 
37 Rolland Nadege, China's “Belt and Road Initiative”: Underwhelming or Game-Changer? 
Washington Quarterly, 2017, p. 2. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Findings of The Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and 
Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act 








superpower, and the United States is not willing to give up that title without a fight. Though 
many questioned the effectiveness of the Trump administration’s tariffs and rhetoric towards 
China, it is undeniable that overall, a great deal of effort was spent attempting to protect 
American industries and consumers. Many believed this would change when Joe Biden was 
elected president, given the nature of his past relations with China, but it does not seem like that 
will be the case.  
On January 31st, 2021, President Biden reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to 
protectionism with an expansion of The Committee on Foreign Investment in the US’s (CFIUS) 
powers. A tool commonly used by the Trump administration, CFIUS’s role is primarily to review 
foreign investments in US companies and real estate for potential national-security risks. With 
Biden hiring additional personnel for the committee, and the team’s “sights on venture-capital 
investments, even small-dollar deals, where the money can be traced back to China,” it seems 
that tensions will continue to rise into the foreseeable future.40 In a sense, the United States and 
China’s individualistic policies are shying away from globalization and turning back to the 
nationalistically-driven global framework of the early 20th century. 
As CFIUS continues to look into Chinese investments in the United States, it must 
question if it is acting in a way that makes sense and if its perception of Chinese firms is correct. 
With such large amounts of capital flowing into the United States from China, by investors 
looking to grab intangible intellectual property, and likewise from the United States into China, 
by investors looking to find the next Alibaba, the lines are now more blurred than ever in regards 
 







to what constitutes the nationality of a firm. With firms currently existing in numerous capacities 
and forms, a deeper dive must be taken to determine what nation each firm truly belongs to. A 
proper model for defining firm nationality is essential to track China’s progress and to ascertain 














































This chapter explains the general process involved in the collection of my data. Any info 
collected throughout this process is openly obtainable and can be manipulated to recreate my 
results by following the steps I lay out in Chapter Four.    
 
3.1 RETRIEVING MY DATA 
 
Hoping to find a way to properly define firm nationality, I received funding to access the 
investment database Crunchbase. Crunchbase sources data from “more than 3,500 global 
investment firms that submit monthly portfolio updates” in hopes of “democratizing the way 
investors access opportunity.”41 This relationship ensures Crunchbase has firsthand access to the 
most up-to-date information regarding companies including, their locations, funding rounds, and 
investors. Crunchbase also utilizes artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms to 
validate data accuracy, scanning for anomalies, and alerting their data science team of conflicts 
in the data. 
Although Crunchbase’s data was extremely useful, some missing pieces would have been 
useful to analyze; specifically, the exact investment amounts that hedge funds hold in specific 
 







companies. This lack of data is not entirely their fault, as early funding rounds in private 
companies are not required to be disclosed to the public. Though this data would have helped, I 
made do without it.  
Looking to study Chinese firms on the Crunchbase database, I narrowed the list of all 
firms by location of headquarters in China to end up with a list of 30,462 individual entities. I 
then compressed this search further by filtering out all firms with under 51 employees; this made 
my list into one of 12,921 primarily large, valuable companies. With this list constructed, I then 
used Crunchbase’s download tools to download the data of the lead five investors in each of 
these firms; this metric is determined by the value of the funding rounds each investor has taken 
part in.  
With a list of these names compiled, I filtered out all duplicates and ranked the remaining 
6,411 investors by the number of times they were listed as a lead five investor. I cut this list to 
the final list that I choose to explore. It was 80 investors, which constituted 30% of the total 
number of lead investors. I assumed that companies that are most frequently named as lead 
investors have also made the most significant investments in terms of capital.  
With my data set clean and ordered, I once again used Crunchbase’s search feature to 
individually download the investment data for all 80 of these investors. With all of these 
investments compiled into one data processing document, I began to explore the data to find 
defining characteristics for firm nationality, insights into the nature of start-up markets in the US 















EXPLORING THE DATA 
 
 
In this chapter, I aim to display the complications surrounding firm nationality. After 
identifying that many investors that appear Chinese may be American, I track capital flows and 
compare the investors’ founding location to their headquarters location; this shows that even the 
most popular tools for defining nationality do not work as intended. I then look into China’s 
largest firms’ executive boards to identify trends in education and nationality.  
 
4.1 HQ LOCATION VS. FOUNDING LOCATION OF ALL 
INVESTORS 
 To begin the exploration of my data set, I first looked to track the path of capital by 
ranking the locations by investor density. To do this, I sorted the investments by which city was 
listed as their investors’ founding headquarters (HQ). I then ranked the list by the number of 
















As shown in Figure and Table 4.1, the location with the highest density of investor 
headquarters out of my sample was by far Beijing, China, with 5,792 HQs. This was followed by 
the American site with the highest investor HQ density, Menlo Park, California, with 2,771 
investor HQs. Out of the 12 locations with the highest investor HQ density, seven were located 
in China, totaling 11,204 HQs, six were found in the United States, totaling 6,486 HQs, and one 
was located in Singapore, totaling 422 investor HQs. It is important to note that out of the six 
locations in the United States, five were located in California, making up 4,837 of the total 6,486 
American Investor HQ locations.  
Defining firm nationality solely by Investor HQ would be extremely useful had 
globalization never occurred, but with tax implications essentially dictating investor HQ decision 
making, this metric is not helpful without greater context; this data does not entirely accurately 
track capital because it does not take into consideration investors who may be investing through 
shell companies or under the umbrella of a larger entity. An example of this is Sequoia Capital 
China; although Sequoia Capital China’s headquarters is technically located in Beijing, China, 
the firm is a subsidiary of the larger Sequoia Capital, which was founded and is currently located 
in Menlo Park, California. For this reason, I needed to refine my data to better account for these 
alternative investor structures. 
To more accurately get a picture of capital flow paths, I used Crunchbase and investor 
relations sites to compile a list of all the investors’ founding HQ locations. Although some of 














As can be seen in Figure and Table 4.2, although many of the locations of investor 
founding HQs are the same as their listed HQ location, there are some noticeable differences. 
Confirming my broader suspicions, it seems as though many investors are using alternative 
structures to ground their investments. Compared to the earlier investor location HQ data, there 
are notably nearly 2,000 fewer investors located in Beijing, China, about 800 more investors in 
Menlo Park, California, and nearly 1,800 more investors located in Boston, MA. There is some 
variance from practically all of the earlier numbers, but much of it is not particularly evident, 
with changes of less than 200 investors in almost all instances.  
This new data gives a broader sense of where the capital for the investors is coming from; 
out of the 18 locations listed, eight are from China, which totaled 8,979 HQs, eight are from the 
United States, which totaled 9,767 HQs, one is from Hong Kong, which totaled 971 HQs, and 
one is from Germany, which totaled 124 HQs. Although at first glance, one would see these 
investors as primarily Chinese due to their headquarters location, as can be seen, this is not the 
case; the United States is the largest source of capital for many of the investors on the list. 
 
4.2 PRIMARY NATIONALITY OF THE INVESTMENTS 
With knowledge regarding investors’ backgrounds, I then began to explore their 
investments collectively. I used the list of investments that I had filtered by location to add and 
calculate, as a whole, whether the investors’ investments primarily fell in the United States or 
China. This was done by separating and adding the total amounts of USD raised in China and the 






location had the higher value in USD would represent the primary country of focus for the 




   
With a total amount of funding more than double that of firms in the United States, in the 
dataset, the Chinese firms are clearly attracting absorbent amounts of capital. Figure and Table 
4.3 show that investors’ primary focus, which is 69% of their total amount of funding, is on 






4.3 MOST COMMON TYPES OF FUNDING USED IN 
INVESTMENTS 
Knowing investors’ broad focus, I then began to look into the methods of funding used in 
the investors’ investments. To do this, I populated a list that summed the number of times a type 
or series of funding was used; for example, if Firm A had participated in angel funding, a Series 







As one would expect and as is shown in Figure and Table 4.4, series A and B funding rounds 
dominated the data due to the typical progression, alphabetically, of funding rounds. The lesser 
presence of C, D, and E funding rounds showed that not all of the investors’ investments were 
solely in start-ups; a portion of their capital was funding later-stage ventures. Interestingly, the 
quantities of angel and seed investments were nearly identical, while both far outpaced private 
equity investments.  
` 
4.4 HQ LOCATION VS. FOUNDING LOCATION OF 
INVESTORS IN CHINESE-BASED FIRMS  
With a better understanding of how exactly the investors were financing their 
investments, I then broke down the investments into two subsets based on whether their HQ was 
located in the United States or China. I did this to explore if there were any variances in investor 
nationality, dependent upon the country the investment was made in. Focusing on China first, I 
took the list of all of the investors’ investments and filtered out all locations not located within 
China. I then followed the same steps as my initial investor HQ search and compiled a ranked list 












As was expected, given my previous findings regarding discrepancies between HQ 
location and the true origin of capital and as is shown in Figure and Table 4.5, HQs in China 
were most common for investors in Chinese firms. Out of the 14 top locations, seven were 
located in China, totaling 10,164 of the HQs, six were found in the USA, totaling 1,380 HQs, 
and one was located in Singapore, totaling 97 HQs. With this information, I then performed the 
same sort and rank of the investors in Chinese firms, but for that search, I used the investors’ 









As is shown in Figure and Table 4.6, China also dominated the founding location of 
many of the investors, though by not as large of a margin. Out of the 17 areas listed, seven were 
located in China, totaling 7,403 HQs, eight were found in the United States, totaling 3,807 HQs, 
one was located in Singapore, totaling 190 HQs, and one was located in Germany, totaling 113 
HQs. The most significant differences in HQ density came in Beijing, China, which had nearly 
2,300 fewer investor HQs than in the search prior, in Boston, MA, which had about 1500 more 
HQs, and in Menlo Park, CA, which had nearly 550 more HQs, the other locations were 
relatively stable with a less than 400 HQ margin difference between both searches. Although at 
first glance a firm may have its HQ located in China and its capital may seem to be Chinese, 






this blurs the lines of what nationality the firm should be considered as. This example explicitly 
shows the ambiguities regarding firm nationality; if a firm’s location differs from the source of 
its capital, how should it be considered? 
 
4.5 HQ LOCATION VS. FOUNDING LOCATION OF 
INVESTORS IN UNITED STATES-BASED FIRMS 
Having a general understanding of the nationality of Chinese firms, I then 
performed the same search on firms based in the United States to see if the trend held up. For this  
search, I filtered out all investments not located in the United States and then ranked and sorted 








Figure and Table 4.7 demonstrate that for firms that have their HQ located within the 
United States, their investors are also primarily headquartered within the United States. Of the 14 
locations listed, six were located within the United States, totaling 4,062 HQs, seven were 
located in China, totaling 1,022 HQs, and one was found in Singapore, totaling 176 HQs. Given 
the aforementioned concerns of the United States regarding technology theft by China, with four 
times as many United States-based investors as Chinese-based ones, this data did not seem 
entirely correct. To confirm my assumption, I once again ran the same sort and rank on the 















As can be seen in Figure and Table 4.8, upon completing the investor founding location 
density rank and sort, there was very little difference from the initial search of the United States-
based firms’ investors. While I had initially thought that many more of the United States 
headquartered investors would be funded by Chinese money, that did not turn out to be the case. 
Out of the 17 locations listed, the United States had eight locations, totaling 4,278 investor 
founding HQs, China had seven locations, totaling 794 HQs, Singapore had one location, 
totaling 177 HQs, and Germany had one location, totaling 7 HQs. Rather than even a small 
increase, as I had predicted, the number of Chinese-based investors decreased slightly when 
considering founding location.  
It is important to note, given how I went about collecting the data, that these numbers do 
not necessarily represent the broader array of investors in United States-based firms. With the 
investments I analyzed being those of the lead five investors initially compiled, and knowing 
their China focus, it makes sense that my search would not capture the entirety of Chinese 
investments within the United States.  
 
4.6 CM2025 INDUSTRIES 
Turning away from capital flows, I began to focus specifically on CM2025 industries 
within the investment data.  Given that China’s focus has been primarily on developing CM2025 
industries over the past ten years, I sought to investigate how the 80 lead investors behaved 
within the Information Technology; Pharmaceuticals and Advanced Medical Devices; 






Materials; Electrical Generation and Distribution fields. I also wished to see if there was any 
variance in this behavior, whether it occurred in the United States or China. 
Initially looking within China, I sorted the data by location so that all non-China-based 
investments were excluded. Then, utilizing the “Organization Industry” search feature of my data 








As is shown in Figure and Table 4.9, out of the firms located within China, 1,855 fell 
under the CM2025 industry umbrella. While Information Technology was by far the most 
dominant field, with 777 firms, Pharmaceuticals and Advanced Medical Devices, Transportation, 
and Robotics were all similar in their number of firms, each around 300, and were followed by 
Agricultural Machinery and Equipment, Advanced Materials, and Electrical Generation and 
Distribution, each of which had less than 100 firms. Although investor specialization may have 
influenced my results, as was expected, China is well on its way to becoming self-sufficient in 
CM2025 industries. 
With a solid grasp of the landscape of CM2025 industry firms China in my data set, I 
began to look at the investors’ investments within the United States. Given the public outcry by 
United States government officials regarding technology theft and current protectionist policies, I 
expected a strong presence of CM2025 industries within the United States firms. For this search, 
I sorted the data by location so that all non-United States-based investments were excluded and 








Figure and Table 4.10 show that out of the United States-based firms, 2,131 were 
considered part of a CM2025 industry. Overall, the proportion of firms in each field were very 
similar throughout the United States and China, although the exact numbers were slightly varied. 
Information Technology once again led the pack, with around 300 more firms than China, 
following next was Pharmaceuticals and Advanced Medical Devices, with nearly 200 more firms 
than China. Transportation and Robotics once again had very similar numbers, which both were 
less than in China, but within 100 firms. The remaining fields, Agricultural Machinery and 
Equipment, Advanced Materials, and Electrical Generation and Distribution, all also had slightly 
lesser numbers than their equivalents in China but were each within 20 or fewer firms. 
Given these results, it seems that United States’ concerns over theft in CM2025 industries 
may be warranted. With the 80 lead investors being substantially invested in these industries, in 
both the United States and China, there is a reasonable case to be made that technology and 
intellectual property are legitimately being transferred from one nation to the other. More 






new orders, it seems likely that actions will be taken to prevent illegal transfers in the coming 
years.  
4.7 EDUCATION OF EXECUTIVES 
China’s goal of becoming technologically self-sufficient poses several questions 
regarding what self-sufficiency truly means. At the most basic level, China is attempting to build 
the CM2025 industries and supply chains domestically, thus, making them geographically 
Chinese, but in terms of ownership, the issue is much more political and unclear, especially 
regarding the education of executives. To dig into the theoretical implications of a ban on 
executives being educated in the United States, I looked into the educational backgrounds of 
executives at the largest firms located within China. To do this, I first filtered out all non-China-







With a list of the largest firms in China compiled, I then went back onto Crunchbase and 
used the “People” search feature to identify each company’s executives and their educations. 
Although I had hoped to find at least two senior executives for each firm, the available 
information was somewhat limited, and I could not find information for all of the firms. To 
combat this problem, I included additional executives from the other firms; altogether, I looked 










As can be seen in Figure 4.12, the educations of the executives spanned a wide variety of 
schools. While most schools only had one executive who attended their institution, Beijing 
University of Posts and Telecommunications had two, and Tsinghua University boasted a 
whopping four executives. With my list of executives’ schools compiled, I then began to explore 
how United States educational institutions compared to Chinese ones, in terms of numbers of 
executives who attended each, and to see if any specific locations dominated the pack. Although 
many of the schools’ locations were intuitive given their names, to be accurate, I utilized Google 















As can be seen in figures 4.13 and 4.14, twenty-one executives were educated in China, 
while only five were educated in the United States; of those five, two were educated in both the 
United States and China. Within China itself, Beijing was the most frequented city to be 
educated in, with 12 executives educated there; all other cities had only one executive educated 
there, except Liaoning, which had two. Overall, it seems that if China was to put in place an 
outright foreign education ban, that the effects would not be too drastic; given the data, it appears 
that China is already very much self-sufficient in the education of its executives. I wonder if such 
a policy would affect Chinese firms’ ability to be competitive selling products in foreign 
markets. If, theoretically, an American education gives these executives an edge due to increased 




































This chapter provides a general understanding of what my research means as a whole. 
After discussing my findings, I then ponder my data’s primary implications and provide 
questions for further research going forward.  
 
5.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The current adversarial relationship between the United States and China can be best 
described as one that is pushing back against the globalist tendencies of the late-20th century 
in favor of more nationalistic ones. As China attempts to accomplish the goals laid out in 
China Manufacturing 2025 and the United States continues to respond with retaliatory 
actions and tariffs, global production networks and alliances throughout the world will be 
greatly affected.  
If the United States wishes to remain the world’s primary superpower, its response must 
be consistent with the current structure of traditional and start-up markets, which can be 
tricky given the global fragmentation of many of today’s firms. Firm nationality can no 






As was seen in Chapter Four, although many firms may appear to be Chinese based upon 
geographic location, many of their primary investors, and the capital behind them, are truly 
United-States based. As the United States continues to utilize its regulatory tools, such as the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States for managing incoming capital and 
imports, and the Bureau of Industry and Security for managing outgoing capital and exports, 
firm nationality must be looked at through a modern analytic lens. Suppose most of a firm’s 
capital is being spent in China, the firm is primarily located in China, but ownership is 
mainly coming from the United States; in that case, its individual circumstances must be 
looked into to determine its nationality properly. 
If the United States continues to regulate firms based upon their geographic location, they 
may cause unintended harm to markets as well as individual firms. Geographic location is 
and will stay relevant to firm nationality, but alternative factors must be considered as part of 
the equation when evaluating a firm in today’s world. Before taking predatory actions, it is 
necessary to consider circumstances surrounding firms holistically to ensure that proper 
decisions are made.  
5.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
As the United States and China both attempt to clean the networks they operate within, 
each must consider new factors when retaliatorily targeting firms; considerations of firm 
nationality must be adapted to fit the layout of today’s modern firms. More so than ever, it is 
essential to take account of geographic location, investor location, employee nationality, and 






Headquarters location has been and will likely remain an effective partial determinant for 
firm nationality and a deciding factor in whether a nation will interfere in a firms’ practices. 
Though a firm may have subsidiaries throughout the world, its headquarters location has 
political implications due to the legal jurisdiction of the nation it is located within. Even if 
most of a firm’s business is completed in another nation, domestic governmental oversight 
and local laws dictate both internal and external policy at the headquarters and can 
significantly impact broader business structure and strategy. Given that many times, 
headquarters location also correlates to where a firm has its highest density of employees, it 
can alternatively be used as a rough measure of a firm’s workforce’s nationality. Employee 
nationality can help determine the local labor laws and regulations that a firm works within.  
When determining a firm’s nationality, its primary investors’ founding locations are also 
necessary to consider. As was seen with the example of Sequoia Capital and Sequoia Capital 
China, although an investment may initially seem to be of one nationality, when the path of 
its capital is tracked to its origin, it will often be from another nation, which is commonly 
where the founding location is located.  Knowledge of a firm’s investors’ founding locations 
is essential if a proper determination is to be made as to the firm’s nationality. 
Given that a small leadership team controls the day-to-day operations and has central 
decision-making responsibilities in nearly all firms, it is imperative to consider executives’ 
backgrounds when contemplating firm nationality. Although executives’ nationality and 
education may not initially seem to be essential elements of a firm, each influences how 






executive team may not be particularly telling of a firm’s nationality, a more homogeneous 
one can give great insights into a firm’s inner workings and its true nationality.  
5.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The next few decades will be particularly telling for the future of global markets as a 
whole. If the United States and China continue in their battle for superiority, it is more likely 
than not nationalistic tendencies will cause firms to back away from globalization and to 
place a greater emphasis on domestic sourcing and production. To limit such a transition’s 
damages, it is necessary that nations dig below the surface when defining firm nationality.  
As the landscape of global firms continues to change, further research will be necessary 
to ensure that definitions of firm nationality are, in fact, up to date and correct. Although my 
study produced telling results, a more in-depth data set that included the specific amount of 
investment for investors would increase accuracy and generate further conclusions. The 
constantly evolving nature of modern firms necessitates continual exploration of firm data. 
Future research, aimed at discovering alternative indicators of company location and firm 
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